The Art of Self Creation - One

PART ONE: SELF

Preamble - What am I?

First and foremost, I am a conscious, thinking thing. Not the states of my body, not my possessions, not any of the circumstances of my material environment, none of these things is important to me, except insofar it contributes to my conscious experience. As a thinking being, the most obvious and important factor in my self-recognition is the extent of the conscious control which I exert over my own thoughts. Different factors, material circumstances, body-states, etc., may recommend themselves to me as being "worthy of attention now" - perhaps even strongly recommend themselves - but the simple fact of the matter is that I possess a theoretically absolute discretion over what I shall choose to attend to at any moment. Empiricism is basically a position which affirms the primary importance of some mind-independent reality in the mind's experience of reality; as such, empiricism is plainly at odds with the notion that conscious choice is the ultimate determinant of conscious experience. If empirical data cannot exert a necessary influence over the way in which they are cognized, then the whole notion of the mind's merely conforming to an objective reality degenerates. Yet, even the Arch-Empiricist, John Locke, admits that,

whilst [the] mind is intently employed in the contemplation of some objects, and curiously surveying some ideas that are there, it takes no notice of [sense-] impressions....

In other words, final discretion resides in the mind over what is "taken notice of in the understanding." This is the essence of the Cartesian ego cogito, "I am that which now creates this thought." Moreover, we need not fear the spectre of substantial dualism, nor any other mystical demon. We are merely agreeing with the following extract from Merleau-Ponty's The Structure of Behaviour, as well its analysis, found in a recent work entitled, The Embodied Mind:

"...it is the organism itself...which chooses the stimuli in the physical world to which it will be sensitive...."

In such an approach, then, perception is not simply embedded within and constrained by the surrounding world; it also contributes to the enactment of this world.

It may well be that, at a certain level of analysis, our cognitions are largely determined by our immediate experience of external reality. It is indisputable, however, that at some superordinate level, our cognitive abilities themselves shape and determine the types of experiences to which we will find ourselves subjected. This, in nuce, is the meaning of the cybernetic approach to cognition, an approach consistent with the "Evolutionary Age" prophesied by the visionary Sir Julian Huxley, a "...new phase of human history, which... envisages man as both product and agent of the evolutionary process...."

1

Philosophical Bases of Freedom

The development of the concept of freedom in Western civilization can be traced to the rise of Christianity. For the ancient Greeks, every important event in life was predetermined by the Fates. The only expression of human freedom consisted of the relative grace and dignity with which good or ill fortune was received. For the Christian myth of the Fall, however, it is essential that humankind be capable of exercising free choice; if Adam and Eve were not free in choosing to eat of the fruit of knowledge, then it would be absurd to view them as responsible for that act. On the other hand, human freedom and responsibility are notoriously difficult to reconcile with the concept of an omnipotent deity, author of the universe and all events in it.

The intrinsic value of rational thinking, however, led to its increasing liberation from the superfluous demands of an uncritical religious dogmatism. As the benefits of the progressive spirit began to instill themselves in the hearts and minds of the populace, no longer was it considered impious to think scientifically, without constantly attempting to keep one's thoughts in line with the Bible. (Actually, it was still considered impious - is by some, even today - but, at a certain point, at least was no longer fatal.) In the new spirit of rational thought, divine preordination was replaced with the evidence of an empirical determinism, which then stood in contrast to the introspective evidence of freedom. Scientific thinking works because the phenomena which it observes seem to conform themselves, with great precision and reliability, to fixed laws: physics, chemistry, biology, etc., have all proven the tenability of the hypothesis of a strict physical determinism. And yet, the sense which the thinking mind has that nothing causes or constrains it is too powerful to be disregarded. It is to the philosophical justifications of this sense of freedom that we now turn.

In his Fourth Meditation, Descartes paints us an admirable picture of the consciousness of freedom:

I am conscious of a will so extended as to be subject to no limits....It is free-will alone or liberty of choice which I find to be so great in me that I can conceive no other idea to be more great....the faculty of will consists alone in our having the power of choosing to do a thing or choosing not to do it...or, rather it consists alone in the fact that in order to affirm or deny, pursue or shun those things placed before us by the understanding, we act so that we are unconscious that any outside force constrains us in so doing.

Note that the consciousness of freedom does not necessarily entail that we are actually free, but only requires that we be "unconscious that any outside force constrains us." In other words, it might be possible for our freedom actually to be limited, just so long as we were unaware of the limiting influence.

Similarly, for Kant,

Reason must look upon itself as the author of its own principles independently of alien influences....the will of a rational being can be a will of his own only under the Idea of freedom....

And,

As a rational being, and consequently as belonging to the intelligible world, man can never conceive the causality of his own will except under the Idea of freedom; for to be independent of determination by causes in the sensible world (and this is what reason must always attribute to itself) is to be free.

Now, Kant appears to be saying that the consciousness of freedom does entail actual freedom, that is, being "independent of determination by causes in the sensible world," but what Kant stipulates is that man operates under the idea of freedom, and this could be consistent with a mere lack of awareness of external determination. Kant's freedom is also the function of a particular mode of consciousness, to wit, rationality. It may well be that freedom is a function of the rational faculty, but nothing is more evident than the fact that we do not always act in accordance with the dictates rationality.

The relation between freedom of will and the faculty of reason or understanding is further elaborated by Descartes, who affirms that,

...the will is much wider in its range and compass than the understanding. I do not restrain it within the same bounds, but extend it also to things which I do not understand: and as the will is of itself indifferent to these, it easily falls into error and sin, and chooses the evil for the good, or the false for the true.

In fact, even within its range and compass, our understanding is notoriously imperfect - we are always inclined to believe we know more than we really do.^* Thus, when we choose based on an accurate understanding, we believe ourselves free in our choice and actually are free, but when we choose based on an inaccurate understanding, or beyond our understanding altogether, then we

believe ourselves free, but, in fact, are not. This is true based on the assumption that a choice which is made with sufficient understanding is a choice which accomplishes what was intended, and that, conversely, a choice made without sufficient understanding does not accomplish what was intended. Of course, a choice is simply an active intention, and an intention which intends not to accomplish what is intended is self-contradictory. So the actions resulting from a choice made with insufficient understanding cannot be intentional actions. In other words, such actions are not self-caused or free, but externally caused or determined.

The preceding conception of freedom extends back to Plato, whose position may be summarized as follows: No man willingly chooses what he believes will harm him, but always what he believes will be good for him. Wrong actions are necessarily harmful. Therefore, men act wrongly out of ignorance. Furthermore, wrong actions cannot be voluntary.

The last point may seem slightly tenuous; Plato treats it very much as a self-evident truth. So does Aristotle, who remarks that, "It is of course generally recognized that actions done under constraint or due to ignorance are involuntary." A simple explanation is that, since wrong actions accomplish something other than what was intended, they demonstrate an obvious lack of understanding. Logically, one cannot be responsible for something if one did not intend to do it. So that which is accomplished without understanding cannot be caused by the intention to do it, and is, therefore, not the product of free will, but must be externally caused. QED. Of course, the use of logical responsibility in this argument does not give us a satisfactory picture of the status of ethical and epistemological responsibility in real life. If my intentions go awry due to some totally unforeseeable circumstance, then, of course, no one can hold me responsible. But if my intentions fail due to some factor about which I should, or even could have known, then I may be forced to assume responsibility for the consequences of my actions. Note that, in the latter case, my actions would still be involuntary from a logical perspective. Logically, making a choice given any degree of awareness of a lack of understanding in the matter is equivalent to submitting one's actions to external determination, voluntarily relinquishing one's freedom; this is the crux of the whole problem of self-deception.

It is evident that we do not exercise our rational freedom in all circumstances; in many cases, we allow ourselves to be seduced into action even with a relative lack of understanding, because of ambitions or desires. Now, depending on the motivation, such action may be quite legitimate. In attempting something utterly new, we are voluntarily accepting a risk in transcending the limits of present understanding. Then our actions may be said to be justified in the sense that we stake our very existence on the authenticity of our motives; this is what I will call the ontological gamble. As part of the reconciliation of freedom and determinism, it will also be argued that it is an important function of free or internally motivated (autotelic) behaviour to create a physical context wherein it is possible to submit oneself to determinism or externally motivated (heterotelic) behaviour because one is in the presence of a desideratum. For the moment, however, we are concerned with amassing some philosophical conceptions of freedom. We will turn, lastly, to Sartre's existential analysis of the ego, which will form a useful bridge to some interesting cognitive issues.

FOOTNOTES

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