Will, Desire and Object

Jung raises some interesting points regarding the projection of qualities onto things (object cathexes) based on the nature of the underlying desire (libido). This suggests that there are fundamentally different types of desires, however, when in fact there is a stratification, elaboration or sublimation of the basic underlying “driving force” by virtue of its being subjected to a counterforce. In other words, desire is the basic psychic impetus, and will is the countermeasure through which application the desired object becomes evermore sophisticated.

If desire were the sole or even fundamental driving force, then it would always dictate the course of action leading to its most immediate resolution. And since there are mechanisms aplenty to facilitate this resolution (instincts), for all practical purposes desire would always be essentially proximate to its fulfillment. In fact, this is exactly the case for the “evolved psyche” (by which I do not mean a psyche that is “more evolved” than others, but rather the psyche that is the product of biological and social evolutionary forces and therefore constructed of behavioural instincts, what we might describe as the “material core”). So while there unquestionably is a desire which is a desire projected outward, there must also be another desire which is the desire not to accede to the proximate fulfillment of the projected desire.

It is possible that the fulfillment of primitive or primordial desire involves a regression into the infantile/archetypal psyche, so that the union of desire and its object may be best described as the collision of vast but relatively undifferentiated masses of psychic energy. At the most primitive extreme is the case of the worship of or union with the divine being, which stands as the sine qua non of psychic experience while at the same time totally eludes elaboration, except through cryptics and paradox:

Take me to you, imprison me, for I,
Except you'enthrall me, never shall be free,
Nor ever chaste, except you ravish me.”
(Donne, Batter My Heart)

But if primitive union is achieved, how does that glorify the divine (any more than it already is) or exalt and ennoble man? To put it another way, desire by definition seeks a desideratum, that is, that thing which is desirable. When the body thirsts, it seeks water, not sand. A desire is what it is. Consequently, when the desideratum appears, the desire must annihilate itself upon and within the desideratum. Moreover, desire, by its very nature, is perfect desire; it seeks what is most perfect, and what will most perfectly fulfill it. (This is basically what Plato recognized when he observed that every individual always chooses what he or she believes will be good for him or herself). When we drink from the fountain of the divine, we do not expect our thirst to return.

Only to the extent that the thing was not the desideratum can the desire be reborn.

Reflections on Mortality

Ye fucking gods! Surely there is a reason to reflect on these matters instead of merely climbing in the vehicle and throwing it into gear. Elemental forces animate us. Does anyone seriously doubt the cosmic importance of this thing we call life? Or consciousness? We are propelled by elemental forces, yet the entire story of our civilization consists of our attempts to resist them, to deny them, to keep them in check. And why? I’ll tell you why. In one word. Ego.

I is the anti-force, the great, greedy black hole that wants to engulf everything, even though doing so would mean its own destruction. Yet, if this is so, then why do the elementals still animate us? Because the story can only unfold from a specific perspective. There must be selves that have limitations and unique challenges and unique achievements in order for the archetypes to be born, and reborn.

Then the last and greatest story, the ultimate archetype, must be that of the supercession of the self, the annihilation of the ego. If the power of the ego is essentially that of the pleasure principle, then the final test must be the denial of the burgeoning threat of ego-pleasure. All thought of self-satisfaction and self-congratulation must be exposed and eliminated. This seems trivial as a theoretical exercise. The desideratum is clear, so what is to prevent us from achieving it?

The problem is, I think, that we are driven by specific desires and goals, ego-desires and ego-goals. So while me may be aiming beyond the limitations of ego, we have no way to get there except through the limitations of ego. We are constantly forced to refine and overcome our desires and goals, making them more and more powerful, more elemental, more difficult to resist. Only in this way can the conditions for the ultimate transcent be brought into being.

Rule by Consent

I believe that the concept of "democracy" trivially implies rule by consent. And it is NOT merely "consent of the majority" that is required. The democratic system as a selection procedure stipulates that we agree to accede to the majority's selection, but once elected, that government becomes a government for ALL individuals (indeed, how could it be otherwise, since ballots are secret?) So any existing democratic government governs only insofar as its citizens consent to its rule. Then there must be some underlying "Social Contract" which validates the rule of government according to its PERFORMANCE for its citizens, who then voluntarily consent to be ruled, granting it its authority.

Now, let us assume that the government no longer rules by consent because its policies no longer serve the best interests of all, or even of a majority of its citizens, but of only, oh, I don't know, say the 2% of the population who control 98% of the resources. Question: is that government still a democracy?

I don't think so.

Panoptikon of Truth

Right now I'm just sort of ruminating on a jumble of concepts. First there is the notion of cognitive-effort versus will. I saw an experiment on Discovery's "Daily Planet" which purported to show that will-power was a finite or at least locally-depletable resource. Fundamentally, I think all that can be measured experimentally (in a controlled context, at any rate) is cognitive effort. Without conducting an extensive theoretical analysis (which I positively do enjoy) a simple example most clearly demonstrates the difference. Obviously, completing a crossword puzzle requires some cognitive effort. On the other hand, if one is a "cossword-junkie," the act of not doing a crossword while at work requires willpower. Most interesting of all, suppose that one's boss walks into the office. At that time, the act of not-doing the crossword does not require any significant amount of willpower. In other words, will power by its very nature resists experimental analysis and does not necessarily itself involve cognitive effort.

This then segues into the related concept of what I have been calling the "public self," what Sartre refers to as Being-for-Others. How is it that publicity, being involved, affiliated, or even merely present or observed, can so radically affect our self-concept? I am particularly intrigued by Bentham's Panoptikon in this respect - the prison of constant surveillance. I see us as striving for enlightenment, but it can only be reached if we subject our self to a "Panoptikon of Truth."

The Art of Self Creation - One

PART ONE: SELF

Preamble - What am I?

First and foremost, I am a conscious, thinking thing. Not the states of my body, not my possessions, not any of the circumstances of my material environment, none of these things is important to me, except insofar it contributes to my conscious experience. As a thinking being, the most obvious and important factor in my self-recognition is the extent of the conscious control which I exert over my own thoughts. Different factors, material circumstances, body-states, etc., may recommend themselves to me as being "worthy of attention now" - perhaps even strongly recommend themselves - but the simple fact of the matter is that I possess a theoretically absolute discretion over what I shall choose to attend to at any moment. Empiricism is basically a position which affirms the primary importance of some mind-independent reality in the mind's experience of reality; as such, empiricism is plainly at odds with the notion that conscious choice is the ultimate determinant of conscious experience. If empirical data cannot exert a necessary influence over the way in which they are cognized, then the whole notion of the mind's merely conforming to an objective reality degenerates. Yet, even the Arch-Empiricist, John Locke, admits that,

whilst [the] mind is intently employed in the contemplation of some objects, and curiously surveying some ideas that are there, it takes no notice of [sense-] impressions....

In other words, final discretion resides in the mind over what is "taken notice of in the understanding." This is the essence of the Cartesian ego cogito, "I am that which now creates this thought." Moreover, we need not fear the spectre of substantial dualism, nor any other mystical demon. We are merely agreeing with the following extract from Merleau-Ponty's The Structure of Behaviour, as well its analysis, found in a recent work entitled, The Embodied Mind:

"...it is the organism itself...which chooses the stimuli in the physical world to which it will be sensitive...."

In such an approach, then, perception is not simply embedded within and constrained by the surrounding world; it also contributes to the enactment of this world.

It may well be that, at a certain level of analysis, our cognitions are largely determined by our immediate experience of external reality. It is indisputable, however, that at some superordinate level, our cognitive abilities themselves shape and determine the types of experiences to which we will find ourselves subjected. This, in nuce, is the meaning of the cybernetic approach to cognition, an approach consistent with the "Evolutionary Age" prophesied by the visionary Sir Julian Huxley, a "...new phase of human history, which... envisages man as both product and agent of the evolutionary process...."

1

Philosophical Bases of Freedom

The development of the concept of freedom in Western civilization can be traced to the rise of Christianity. For the ancient Greeks, every important event in life was predetermined by the Fates. The only expression of human freedom consisted of the relative grace and dignity with which good or ill fortune was received. For the Christian myth of the Fall, however, it is essential that humankind be capable of exercising free choice; if Adam and Eve were not free in choosing to eat of the fruit of knowledge, then it would be absurd to view them as responsible for that act. On the other hand, human freedom and responsibility are notoriously difficult to reconcile with the concept of an omnipotent deity, author of the universe and all events in it.

The intrinsic value of rational thinking, however, led to its increasing liberation from the superfluous demands of an uncritical religious dogmatism. As the benefits of the progressive spirit began to instill themselves in the hearts and minds of the populace, no longer was it considered impious to think scientifically, without constantly attempting to keep one's thoughts in line with the Bible. (Actually, it was still considered impious - is by some, even today - but, at a certain point, at least was no longer fatal.) In the new spirit of rational thought, divine preordination was replaced with the evidence of an empirical determinism, which then stood in contrast to the introspective evidence of freedom. Scientific thinking works because the phenomena which it observes seem to conform themselves, with great precision and reliability, to fixed laws: physics, chemistry, biology, etc., have all proven the tenability of the hypothesis of a strict physical determinism. And yet, the sense which the thinking mind has that nothing causes or constrains it is too powerful to be disregarded. It is to the philosophical justifications of this sense of freedom that we now turn.

In his Fourth Meditation, Descartes paints us an admirable picture of the consciousness of freedom:

I am conscious of a will so extended as to be subject to no limits....It is free-will alone or liberty of choice which I find to be so great in me that I can conceive no other idea to be more great....the faculty of will consists alone in our having the power of choosing to do a thing or choosing not to do it...or, rather it consists alone in the fact that in order to affirm or deny, pursue or shun those things placed before us by the understanding, we act so that we are unconscious that any outside force constrains us in so doing.

Note that the consciousness of freedom does not necessarily entail that we are actually free, but only requires that we be "unconscious that any outside force constrains us." In other words, it might be possible for our freedom actually to be limited, just so long as we were unaware of the limiting influence.

Similarly, for Kant,

Reason must look upon itself as the author of its own principles independently of alien influences....the will of a rational being can be a will of his own only under the Idea of freedom....

And,

As a rational being, and consequently as belonging to the intelligible world, man can never conceive the causality of his own will except under the Idea of freedom; for to be independent of determination by causes in the sensible world (and this is what reason must always attribute to itself) is to be free.

Now, Kant appears to be saying that the consciousness of freedom does entail actual freedom, that is, being "independent of determination by causes in the sensible world," but what Kant stipulates is that man operates under the idea of freedom, and this could be consistent with a mere lack of awareness of external determination. Kant's freedom is also the function of a particular mode of consciousness, to wit, rationality. It may well be that freedom is a function of the rational faculty, but nothing is more evident than the fact that we do not always act in accordance with the dictates rationality.

The relation between freedom of will and the faculty of reason or understanding is further elaborated by Descartes, who affirms that,

...the will is much wider in its range and compass than the understanding. I do not restrain it within the same bounds, but extend it also to things which I do not understand: and as the will is of itself indifferent to these, it easily falls into error and sin, and chooses the evil for the good, or the false for the true.

In fact, even within its range and compass, our understanding is notoriously imperfect - we are always inclined to believe we know more than we really do.^* Thus, when we choose based on an accurate understanding, we believe ourselves free in our choice and actually are free, but when we choose based on an inaccurate understanding, or beyond our understanding altogether, then we

believe ourselves free, but, in fact, are not. This is true based on the assumption that a choice which is made with sufficient understanding is a choice which accomplishes what was intended, and that, conversely, a choice made without sufficient understanding does not accomplish what was intended. Of course, a choice is simply an active intention, and an intention which intends not to accomplish what is intended is self-contradictory. So the actions resulting from a choice made with insufficient understanding cannot be intentional actions. In other words, such actions are not self-caused or free, but externally caused or determined.

The preceding conception of freedom extends back to Plato, whose position may be summarized as follows: No man willingly chooses what he believes will harm him, but always what he believes will be good for him. Wrong actions are necessarily harmful. Therefore, men act wrongly out of ignorance. Furthermore, wrong actions cannot be voluntary.

The last point may seem slightly tenuous; Plato treats it very much as a self-evident truth. So does Aristotle, who remarks that, "It is of course generally recognized that actions done under constraint or due to ignorance are involuntary." A simple explanation is that, since wrong actions accomplish something other than what was intended, they demonstrate an obvious lack of understanding. Logically, one cannot be responsible for something if one did not intend to do it. So that which is accomplished without understanding cannot be caused by the intention to do it, and is, therefore, not the product of free will, but must be externally caused. QED. Of course, the use of logical responsibility in this argument does not give us a satisfactory picture of the status of ethical and epistemological responsibility in real life. If my intentions go awry due to some totally unforeseeable circumstance, then, of course, no one can hold me responsible. But if my intentions fail due to some factor about which I should, or even could have known, then I may be forced to assume responsibility for the consequences of my actions. Note that, in the latter case, my actions would still be involuntary from a logical perspective. Logically, making a choice given any degree of awareness of a lack of understanding in the matter is equivalent to submitting one's actions to external determination, voluntarily relinquishing one's freedom; this is the crux of the whole problem of self-deception.

It is evident that we do not exercise our rational freedom in all circumstances; in many cases, we allow ourselves to be seduced into action even with a relative lack of understanding, because of ambitions or desires. Now, depending on the motivation, such action may be quite legitimate. In attempting something utterly new, we are voluntarily accepting a risk in transcending the limits of present understanding. Then our actions may be said to be justified in the sense that we stake our very existence on the authenticity of our motives; this is what I will call the ontological gamble. As part of the reconciliation of freedom and determinism, it will also be argued that it is an important function of free or internally motivated (autotelic) behaviour to create a physical context wherein it is possible to submit oneself to determinism or externally motivated (heterotelic) behaviour because one is in the presence of a desideratum. For the moment, however, we are concerned with amassing some philosophical conceptions of freedom. We will turn, lastly, to Sartre's existential analysis of the ego, which will form a useful bridge to some interesting cognitive issues.

FOOTNOTES

E N D N O T E S

Reality-Perception

Reality-Perception

Typically, we believe we grasp or touch external reality at the most fundamental or concrete level in the immediate and living moment which is the apperception of the now. The key feature of this reality-analog is the notion of "pushing up against something"; and the interesting consequence of pushing is that some things move. We apprehend a world around us, but this is not in any sense a disinterested observation or merely aesthetic appreciation. We apprehend now in order to continue to apprehend in the future, specifically, in such a way that there is an ongoing modification in the nature of our apperceptions; and, moreover, that this ongoing modification is not random (which would be meaningless or, worse, incomprehensible) but is, or at least strives to be, melioristic in nature. In other words, the immediate grasp of external reality always occurs from the standpoint of agency.

If we constantly perceive from the standpoint of agency, then our perceptions must be polarized around some repertoire of abilities. Physical agency naturally presents itself as the basic ability, but actions at the merely mechanical level can hardly be interpreted as melioristic. Value can only inhere in a state of affairs through the application of context. Context is any expansion of the field of perception in time or space which provides information additional to that of apperception. Then the actions of basic physical agency gain value by virtue of interpretation within a supervening context.

Whatever our presuppositions or assumptions about what constitutes "improvement" might be, our agency oriented perceptions must include some awareness of the abilities required to move from the now to some theoretically superior future state (of perception). Now, while our awareness of our basic physical abilities may be reasonably accurate and thorough, as valuational contextualization expands the degree to which we can accurately envision the overall effect of our actions must decrease. Still, as we live and act, the consequences of our choices do unfold fully around us. Thus, in order to gain the most accurate sense of our own abilities, we must learn to contextualize our perceptions of reality to most fully illuminate the consequences of conscious agency. This means that in order to most effectively postulate a superior future, it is necessary to "historicize" oneself.

Unfortunately, the uncertainty which adheres to valuational contextualization applies equally when context is expanded into the past. Personal memories are biased and twisted no less than historical events, until the entire historicity of consciousness sinks into the Jungian quagmire of Archetype and Mythos. Clearly, there are missing pieces yet to this puzzle....

Realization of the Transcendent Self

Realization of the Transcendent Self

I assume at the outset that the apotheosis of consciousness is realized as pure reason, that is, a consciousness whose thoughts and ideas flow according to the dictates of reason and are in every sense "reasonable." Presumably, if this is so, every conscious being is then inspired and quickened by the seed of reason, so that each knows, intuitively if not explicitly, the desideratum of its existence.
In the course of ordinary life, however, it does not always seem clear how to operate according to the dictates of reason. Ethical decisions are certainly good candidates for one paradigm of reason: when conditions are such that a dilemma involving the choice of right over wrong is mandated, the faculty of reason is evoked and either realized, by doing right, or denied, by doing wrong.
In fact, in to the extent that the very nature of conscious being-in-the-world can be described as an ongoing positing of "how to act", every decision is really an ethical decision. According to this view, there can be no such thing as a naturalistic fallacy, no "is-ought" gap. States of affairs or phenomena exist for consciousness qua reason exactly insofar as they figure in the manifestation of reason. Furthermore, for a given state of affairs, when a reasonable assessment is made versus an unreasonable one, then the new state of affairs which has as one of its elements the reasonable judgement must in some sense be intrinsically superior to that with an unreasonable judgement.
Now, states of affairs are being assessed not in and of themselves, but purely in aid of the manifestation of reason. Reason is being discovered, exhibited, created, or otherwise brought into being. This suggests that the exercise of reason is simultaneously the exhibition of reason (further denuding the naturalistic fallacy). There are not nor could ever be vacantly empirical premises. The nearest thing would be a solitary noun like "tree", but it would have to be devoid of any context, implication, even any sense of "pointing." In fact, the very positing of something as a premise, or statement or even a "fact" makes of the thing a mental construct, with all that implies (one cannot posit then deny the fact of positing).
Thus, whenever consciousness evaluates states of affairs, it is in fact evaluating the manifestation of reason implicit within some framing context with respect to some further manifestation of reasonableness on its own part. Indeed, the manifestations of reason are not merely the actions of other conscious beings since these, viewed in isolation, would mean little more than "tree." Rather, what is being grasped and responded to is the underlying theme or essence of the conscious-acting being. In other words, there is an ongoing dialogue with not only the proximate consciousnesses of the immediate context, but a deeper embedded conscious framework extending throughout the entire socio-historic framework.
At the outset we suggested that ethics often appears as the day-to-day paradigm of reason, which led to the recognition of the extrusion of consciousness into the world via its own "act-being." If an ethical dilemma is a common significator of the reasonable faculty, wherein lies the difficulty which makes such a state of affairs a dilemma? On the one hand, reason must identify the correct choice. But there must be some other choice as well, with compelling inducements to counteract the force of right judgement. How can reason be sufficient to reveal the right choice yet not be adequate to assure it?
Consciousness exists, yet it does not fully comprehend why or how. Accordingly, it constantly seeks to posit and affirm its own existence. The "self" of the individual consciousness is the thematic thread that binds the indubitable but still mysterious fact of present awareness simultaneously to a past and future being united by a unique pattern of behaviours. The course of this investigation has suggested the ultimate goal of fully reasoned behaviour; but what is the more common reality? Clearly there is no clear consensus as to reasonable behaviour, beyond the few universally shared aphorisms of the major religions perhaps. These may indeed form the foundations of the first being of consciousness (and the attraction of the Jungian model). But the need for a present being of the self requires act-principles applicable in a much wider variety of situations.
One of the indicators of reason is deliberation, that is, of not hastening to judgement if at all possible (cf. Descartes). Of course, where the dictates of reason are clearly spelled out, (almost) no one hesitates to make the ethical choice (at least while under scrutiny). Likewise, no one is praised for doing so. It must be that the dictates of reason are, in some sense, difficult to apprehend (cf. Aristotle's observation that wisdom is what is difficult and not easy to acquire). Probably we are wont to act too precipitously and forced, therefore, to rely upon the examples of others rather than our own judgement.
The basic pattern for the social self is that of ethical egoism; to wit: actions which enhance the self-concept are valid. But the social self and the reasonable self are not the same. Often, it is in the best interest of the social self to dissimulate, to appear generous in small ways so as to facilitate a deeper greed, to feign a friendship in order to attack a weakness. This implies the existence of another ethic than the ethical egoism of the social self, one which can countermand or counterbalance the ethic of the reasonable self. We may call the being based upon this ethic the hidden self. We now have the framework to consider the intrinsic superiority of reasonable actions.
Recall we said that when people are assessing data towards an act, what they are really doing is evaluating the actions (or act-history) of others. Earlier, it was stipulated that what is being evaluated is the "manifestation of reason in a framing context." If the acts of others are not reasonable acts but merely dissimulations concealing unreasonable acts, then there can be no question of formulating a reasonable response thereto. Communication breaks down. Reason can only follow reason. Furthermore, reason is constructive, which is why it is difficult, and why the less reasonable alternatives are always easier. It is the difference between decay and growth, between entropy and evolution. It is why a life without reason is said to be one of dissipation or dissolution.
If the social self provides the mere illusion of reality and the true being of consciousness lies in its embrace of the reasonable self, where does that leave us if much of what transpires in everyday life is merely the machinations of the social self?
Aristotle suggests that wrong action, being ex hypothesi harmful to the self, must be involuntary. If someone dissimulates a reasonable facade in aid of some other (unreasonable) purpose, do the apparently reasonable actions still have meaning? Perhaps there is a schism of being, where the facade persona actually possesses a more substantial reality than the hidden self. To put it another way, recognizing the need for the facade is itself an exercise of reason which implicates the hidden self. Too, if most people rely only instinctively on the faculty of reason, and the only examples they have ever seen are the reasonable facades of others, small wonder that the common conception of reason is its utility in constructing a reasonable facade to house the hidden self.
Before we make of this something sinister, recall the inherently mysterious nature of consciousness. Perhaps, for the most part, what appears to be reasonable can be taken as such. Perhaps the hidden self serves as an early form of "ego defense" allowing the nascent consciousness to maintain its ipseity when faced with the interpersonal barrage of the social framework. Then, as the being of consciousness becomes more fully elaborated by reason, there must be a shift of the identity from the hidden to the social self. It is in the recognition of this shift and in the embrace of the new identity that the reasonable self begins to emerge.

The Art of Self-Creation - Introduction

The Art of Self-Creation

Michael Lazenby

Introduction

Many people have an inkling that there must be more to life than merely fulfilling the day-to-day habits and the life-recipes we are constantly encouraged to accept as real; even so, most of these will find it necessary actually to fulfil all of the customary conditions before they can attribute suficient certainty to their own intuitions and begin to leave the comforts of custom behind. This is what Freud describes as the "involution phase," the point - usually around middle-age - where the individual, having perfected his or her adaptation to the external world, suddenly begins to turn inward (note the coincidence with the popular notion of the "mid-life crisis"). Having reached this stage, the desire to know a level of consciousness transcending that offered by slavish adherence to the social norms, or else the underlying intuitions are at least strong enough to cause you to devote a certain amount of energy to the study of the hypothesis that such a project is both possible and desirable. I have no doubt that even attaining the latter condition is the beginning of wisdom. For if one resolves to look beyond the world of easy appearances, then there is no explanation for the investment of energy in such a patently non-material pursuit other than this: one desires a glimpse of truth. And any energy invested in the pursuit of a higher good must yield rewards manifold. Such is the only logic whereby an ethical being can possibly exist....

What is the nature of reality? Prima facie, this looks like a very important question, indeed, one whose importance would have to be universally recognized. If its importance is allowed, then a pursuit such as this one, which purports to be searching for deeper meanings than are provided by unreflective adherence to custom and convention, must likewise be acknowledged as valuable. Note that I do not condemn custom or convention, per se, but only the unquestioning obedience thereto. I fully expect that the force of social consensus has been a most discriminating judge of important matters, as is attested by the evidence of thousands of generations of cultural evolution. Thus, I assume that most of the central concepts which we, as cultural beings would purport to value - truth, honesty, self-sacrifice, hard work, etc. - are, in fact, concepts of some substantial worth. We are not, however, the cultural beings whose personae we affect. For example, no political leader aspiring to any degree of public credibility would stand up and proclaim that he or she was against world peace, against human equality, against complete honesty, etc., and yet how many actually take a stand in the name of these principles? Not many; to date, most who have - Gandhi, King, Christ, etc. - have been assassinated. On the other hand, how many follow these principles when actually conducting business, when the cameras aren't around? Let's take a poll, a show of hands, please. Come on, you don't want to appear naive....

As cultural beings, we know these to be the most important issues; and yet, just as surely, we know that "things just don't work that way." There is a climate of conspiracy, wherein we agree not to mention the mysterious duplicity between the cultural selves we pretend to be, and that sinister core of selfishness that would find some pretext of justification to bend any rule in the mere hope of attaining thereby some minute increment of prestige, power, popularity.... In other words, nestled in the very heart of all our legitimate cultural values, like a worm coiled in the apple, like Sartre's nothingness, coiled in the heart of being, there lies a tacitly perpetuated anti-value, which, plainly put, is just this: the prerogative of every individual to ignore social obligations in the name of self-aggrandizement.^a We all take it for granted that, given the chance, any individual will sacrifice the public good for personal gain, and we legitimize this state of affairs by our complicity. Why? Because each of us cherishes the secret ambition that, at some point in the lottery of life, his or her turn will come. After all, have we not been thrust, unasked, into an unfair world and been forced to do things we did not wish to do in order to survive? And if we have been subjected to the brute demands of survival because some others have frittered away our rights to basic human dignity in frivolous and conspicuous material consumption, then why should we scruple to perpetuate the same injustice, given half a chance?

Perhaps I have exaggerated somewhat, made matters seem worse than they are in order to make a point...but have I really? Exactly how deep does ego run in each of us? In you? I am accusing us all of possessing a selfish core willing to sacrifice truth for personal advantage. At what point did your hackles start to rise at what I was saying? Are you really willing to be offended, when by that very offense you are choosing to identify with precisely the objectionable thing that is being criticized? Personal advantage should always be abjured in favour of the public good, that is, the equal good of every individual. There, I've said it! When we proclaim ourselves to our friends, to our neighbours, can we say any less? Then why do we resist making this proclamation to ourselves?

And yet, things are maybe not as bad as they seem. Just as I am not condemning custom, per se, but only the its blind acceptance, likewise, I do not think that ego is all bad. That is, I believe that there are both illegitimate and legitimate types of egoism. Unfortunately, as was said, the type of egoism being generated by current social programming is predominantly of the illegitimate variety, what I called the "tacitly perpetuated anti-value." Nevertheless, if there is a real need for the existence of strong personalities, then we can understand the tenacity with which this anti-value clings to life. If a powerful, cohesive ego-centre is necessary for the evolution of consciousness, then any principle which contributes to that end has a certain justification. What, then, is the nature and function of legitimate egoism?

Of the many things which the course of cultural evolution has taught us to value, one stands head and shoulders above the rest as a good never to be opposed and always to be desired; I am talking, of course about progress. That great nineteenth century champion of individual liberty, John Stuart Mill, is especially instructive on this point:

The despotism of custom is everywhere the standing hindrance to human advancement, being in unceasing antagonism to that disposition to aim at something better than customary, which is called, according to circumstances, the spirit of liberty, or that of progress or improvement....The progressive principle...whether as the love of liberty or improvement, is antagonistic to the sway of Custom...and the contest between the two constitutes the chief interest of the history of mankind. ¹

Since the time of Mill, progress has accelerated at an unprecedented rate, so that the pure opposition of progress and custom described by Mill is no longer strictly true. Custom may be somewhat slow on the uptake, but, as was said, in the long run its judgement appears to be essentially sound. We, in contemporary society, find ourselves shaped by the force of custom so as to be accustomed to the idea of progress. We have a healthy appreciation of the fact that our experience of reality can improve at an astonishing pace, provided we nurture the conditions which make progress possible.

So what are the conditions which make progress possible? Beyond everything else, progress is sponsored by the spirit of the pioneer, the adventurer, the inventor. Only a mind capable of being dissatisfied with all the best that life has to offer has the true courage to seek beyond the bounds of the known for something utterly new. Mill identifies this quality as "genius," and notes that ex vi termini - "from the meaning of the term" - genius really designates precisely that which is most unique to a given individual; but this is what we think of as personality. In other words, we have discovered the function of legitimate egoism. For society to continue to enjoy the benefits of progress, as all of its members surely desired, it was inevitable that social norms contributing to the formation of very strong individual egos should have developed. The essence of this ego-strength, however, consists of an ability not to be bound by those very norms which have brought it into being.

Thus, matters are not quite so clear cut as Mill would have them (or as perhaps they were in Mill's time). Custom cannot be wholly antagonistic to the progressive spirit, but must perpetuate its possibility by means of a class of very special customs whose function it is to liberate the individual will from the despotism of custom. Even so, the great mass of humanity are quite content to be settlers instead of pioneers. Most of us are quite happy to operate within the bounds of custom, and are understandably wary of all those who make it their business to operate outside of accepted parameters. How are we to distinguish creative behaviour from criminal? How are we to know the psychotic from the saint? This caution was also evident to Mill, who remarks that,

People think genius a fine thing if it enables a man to write an exciting poem, or paint a picture. But in its true sense, that of originality in thought and action, though no one says that it is not a thing to be admired, nearly all, at heart, think that they can do very well without it....Originality is the one thing which unoriginal minds cannot feel the use of....If they could see what it would do for them, it would not be originality. ²

Note that, in this passage, Mill is also calling attention to the central dichotomy with which we are so concerned, that of the cultural self each purports to be, who will not say of genius that "it is not a thing to be admired," and that unspeaking core which is quite happy to "do very well without" the values it is forced to proclaim - or, at least, to which it tacitly accedes - in public. More to the current point, however, what Mill is describing is the self-contradictory desire of the cautious masses to enjoy the rewards of allowing a creative mind to blossom, while at the same time constraining that freedom within certain narrow limits, thereby minimizing the risk of public damage, should that freedom go awry. It has always been the lot of the most creative among us to find refuge in the arts, where they may at least do little harm, if not little good.

The issue runs far deeper than the trite cliché of the "tortured artist," however, living and dying in his or her own little world for the sake of an artistic vision and a few miserable artefacts to be admired only after the artist's death. What is being described is the way in which custom, while recognizing the value of creativity and so incorporating specific customs which create contexts of radical freedom, nevertheless, out of caution and fear, attempts to restrict the impact of the radically new - at least until it can be verified. Science itself is little more than a system of highly formalized constraints designed to focus creative thought in a certain area, yes, but also and especially, to permit the validation of creative thought by the larger community. Indeed, most scientific research has become so specialized that no more than a handful of people thoroughly comprehend what is going on in any particular field.^b There is, however, an overlapping system of checks and balances among specialists, whereby certain basic theories are common to a given field, and any research which is to be credible will have to at least proceed from these accepted starting points. Moreover, there is also a system of hierarchical constraints reaching from material to theoretical praxes - i.e. from practical applications in day-to-day life to the highly abstract reasoning of the research scientist. The theoretical scientist must be able to transmit his or her discoveries to students and colleagues, and also be able to provide something substantial, either in the way of a methodology or data, which can be used by the more concrete practitioners, engineers and technicians. Now, the engineers, in turn, repay the theoreticians by constructing for them ever more sophisticated machines, based on the information provided, whereby the latter may further explore their theories. But this technical support is only feasible so long as the technical mechanisms of a given branch of theoretical knowledge can be adapted to produce valuable results^c in the lebenswelt (life-world) of ordinary human experience. Particle physics, for example, has produced quite a lot of tremendously expensive but relatively useless equipment. Its contributions to the field of nuclear medicine, however, give it some pretext of justification. Even so, nuclear medicine is still a long way from being a significant factor in the daily lives of the mass of human beings. Not that we should scrap a technology if it only finds occasional use. We should be thankful that nuclear medicine is used on only a small segment of the population, and we should acknowledge our obligation to provide that life-saving service. Nevertheless, creation of that which will find the most widespread use at the most basic level of human existence must remain an ideal at which we aim. It is just possible that the billions of dollars which have saved a handful of lives "over here" may have been better applied to the problem of malnutrition, saving millions of lives "over there." That fact will remain what it is, no matter whether your spouse, or your child, or even you yourself have been saved from death by some form of nuclear medicine. Personally, I think we can solve both problems, but ethically, we are absolutely obliged to get our priorities straight. Believing that you yourself are the most important being in the universe is a good way to get ahead, if you happen to be possessed of natural advantages, personally or environmentally. Convincing everybody that all life is sacred, however, is a way to focus the maximum resources upon the solution of individual problems, wherever they may appear....

Thus far, we have begun to identify the nature and function of legitimate egoism, as well as the general social conditions under which it is suffered to exist as "creativity." This notion of the strong individualist, unbowed by the burden of social norms and preconceptions, fighting his or her way into a new realm and bringing back a precious treasure which may contribute to a new and improved social order, is neither radical nor new. The tradition of the hero is central to all mythologies, and has been extensively (and brilliantly) analyzed by Joseph Campbell in numerous books. Kierkegaard's "knight of faith" performs actions which cannot be justified by any existing moral standards, but the faith of his actions brings the new level of morality into being. In Answer to Job, the hapless Job, by maintaining his faith despite all manner of torments being inflicted upon him, is interpreted by Jung as achieving a moral victory over an infantile deity, in other words, transcending an outmoded form of morality and thereby bringing a new form into being. The idea of creative exploration as transcending norms is particularly fascinating when applied to a cognitive analysis of the genesis of radical new discoveries. It will be argued that "radical theoretical insights" can only come about by a transcending of existing conceptual frameworks; both Kierkegaard and Jung will be much more closely examined in the elaboration of the psycho-epistemological nature of this phenomenon.

But let us return to our original question; suppose its importance is not allowed. There are people, I am sure, who would object to a question like, "What is the nature of reality?" on the grounds that it was obscurantist, that it takes what is beyond all doubt, our immediate experience of being a real creature living in a real world and involved in real situations, and insinuates that, somehow, we're not quite getting the whole picture. This sort of "common sense realism" can be descried in the attempt by certain logical positivists, in the mid-twentieth century, to "eliminate metaphysics." More practically, however, common sense realism has a kind of bourgeoisie smugness about it, which leads one to believe that the people who are most inclined "to accept things as they are," are not the people who derive the least benefit from that state of affairs. Those who, with paternal condescension, tell us "not to question the obvious" are precisely those who know (or have a pretty good idea) that "the obvious" (which they are trying to perpetuate) will not hold up under rational inquiry. The only thing obvious about the way things are is that we live in a system of legally sanctioned inequality. As long as we continue to abide by laws which permit certain people to have more - and it matters not whether by right of talent, perseverance, or birth - as long as there are those who are entitled to more, there will be a great many others who are forced to make do with less. This is basic math. We live in a closed system. There are finite available material resources. Ergo, for any one to have more, some other must have less....

Of course, the standard objection here is that some people are just plain lazy. Why should someone who is not willing to work be entitled to as much prosperity as a hard worker? Again, the point is an elitist one. Having a strong intellect is no less a chance result of a toss of the genetic dice than having a strong back. But, no matter how hard you are willing to work with your strong back, you will never have the same opportunities for material success as someone with a strong intellect. Theoretically, rationally, the same possibilities should exist for everyone - but they don't. Let us consider a more subtle argument.

Of course, in terms of organic or inborn abilities, different people are suited to different tasks. Perhaps individuals also seek different rewards. It may well be that someone with a strong enough intellect is not satisfied with material rewards, but has to seek the satisfaction of some nebulous "intellectual rewards" - as Mill puts it, "better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied."³ On the other hand, perhaps someone blessed with a strong back might find immense fulfilment in whatever opportunities were afforded him. But there is an additional factor to consider. A human being is not simply the set of physical capacities with which he or she is born. A capacity is only a potentiality; a potentiality can only become an ability if it finds itself in a nurturing environment where it can grow. As Sayre says, in the initial stages of

development, an organism is not "...capable of maintaining itself in the face of an indifferent environment....An acorn that does not sprout rots away or is eaten...."⁴ If it does not find active support, then a capacity is only a seed cast on sterile ground; it may linger, dormant, until there comes life-giving rain, or until it is transplanted to a more fertile land; it may be crushed underfoot by the hostile inhabitants of a hostile land; or it may simply wither, unprotected in the sun, and die, without ever really having been born.... You see what I'm getting at. Even though we're all born with a different and arbitrary set of talents, how we make use of those talents depends on the environment in which we grow. The norms which the common sense realist would maintain are all tainted with the view that economic inferiority implies intellectual and moral inferiority. This is precisely the point made by Lewontin in his book Biology as Ideology:

The nonsense propagated by the ideologues of biological determinism that the lower classes are biologically inferior to the upper classes...is precisely nonsense. It is meant to legitimize the structures of inequality by putting a biological gloss on them and by propagating the continual confusion between what may be influenced by genes and what may be changed by social and environmental alterations.⁵

It must be reiterated, cannot be overemphasized, that those who benefit from a system of inequality cannot be regarded as objective commentators on that system. If we create a climate which is not conducive to intellectual and moral development among the economically challenged, and further limit economic rewards to those who are intellectually and morally developed - or at least possess sufficient acumen to feign the same - then of course most individuals in this position will live up to our worst expectations.^d The fact that our presuppositions have caused something to come to be does not prove that our presuppositions are right. All it proves is that we are capable of shaping ourselves by shaping our environment. Does it not make sense, at this point, to assume responsibility

So it seems that the question, "What is the nature of reality?" could be threatening to those people who enjoy a certain success under a system of preferential norms, beneficial to those holding the other end of the stick. Now, it is obvious that intelligence is a key factor in determining who will benefit from our preferential norms. The rewards so gained can be identified as primarily material (the illusion of moral superiority having been firmly laid to rest). Are these material rewards sufficient recompense for allowing oneself to be seduced into perpetuating social injustice?

What is the nature of happiness? Perhaps those possessed of ample material distraction never even bother to wonder about this question. And yet, the actual range of material pleasures is really quite limited (especially if you wish to operate only within the norms). Once we have satisfied our basic drives - food, sex, etc. - there's not much left to do. So your material wealth allows you to satisfy your basic drives at will - now what? If there is one thing to which human beings adapt with amazing rapidity, it is positive changes in their environment. What begins as a source of intense pleasure soon becomes nothing but a habit, and, eventually, even a source of tedium. Moreover - here is the real kicker - those individuals who are able to amass material wealth because of their intellectual powers are precisely least likely to be satisfied with what they have amassed...because of their intellectual powers. As Mill puts it,

It is indisputable that the being whose capacities of enjoyment are low has the greatest chance of having them fully satisfied; and a highly endowed being will always feel that any happiness which he can look for, as the world is constituted, is imperfect.⁶

The capacity which leads one to master very quickly the task of achieving optimal adaptation to one's environment - a task which might challenge another for an entire lifetime - will soon lead one to recognize that the adaptation is complete, and spur one on to even greater challenges. Thus, it seems unlikely that the question, "What is the nature of reality?", can really be discounted by anyone. To those who suffer in the clutches of oppressive norms, the question promises to annihilate every prejudice with the scrutiny of reason. To those who enjoy the ostensible successes of favourable norms, the question offers the promise of greater, more authentic rewards, happiness too vast ever to keep to oneself, treasures enough for all.

Apology

I fear that, in my impatience to express all of the ideas that plague me, I have leapt too hazardously from half-finished concept to half-finished concept, have given myself over too frequently to verbose diatribe, have, in short, failed to accomplish what I wished to accomplish. Perhaps it has all been for the best, though, inasmuch as it compels me to attempt to formulate the most terse position statement possible. Briefly, my position is as follows: It seems to me self-evident that the existence of consciousness is a phenomenon of such overwhelming importance that any time which is not spent in the relentless task of probing and expanding its boundaries is time utterly wasted.

In elaborating the nature of this task, I may have offended some by constantly berating social customs and social norms. While the notion of a norm is a convenient fiction, it must be stressed that social and behavioural norms have no objective existence. A social critique remains psychologically valid, due to a general belief in the objective status of norms, but it must be stressed that what exists are really myriad individual beliefs about what constitutes a norm. We may constantly attempt to codify, commercialize, or otherwise represent our norms in some intersubjectively verifiable form, but the complexity of life ensures a significant variation in subjective interpretation.^* Thus, my only challenge to the status quo is really a challenge for each individual to commit to a constant and critical examination of his or her own presuppositions.

Doubtless, we are suited to different tasks, all of which contribute to the richness of existence, but the vast importance of this exploratory work must come to be acknowledged by all. For by accepting and condoning such cognitive exploration, non-explorers themselves assume some of the risk, allowing dangerous freedoms to exist in their world and threaten their complacency, and so participate in the great task. This book is intended to effect a transition from the mere acceptance of the premise of the importance of cognitive exploration to a full blown desire to search beyond the parameters of the known for an optimum possible reality. Hegel postulates a transcendental "community of rational beings." Similarly, Heidegger, in his study of Hegel, envisions all philosophers as being involved in one vast, exo-temporal project - when one reads Plato one is working with him, as when one reads Heidegger writing about what happens when one reads Plato, as when one reads someone writing about Heidegger.... Perhaps we are all auditioning for membership in the community of transcendental beings. Perhaps this is an initiation test.

FOOTNOTES

a. Deception, guile, trickery...are not the adventitious
acts of a regrettable minority of persons....They seem
to be an endemic ingredient of our daily activities....
our daily life is characterized by rule violation of one
form or another.... (E.W. Vaz, Aspects of Deviance,
Prentice-Hall 1976, p. 77)

b. Relatively recently, a participant at a mathematical conference
stated, for the record, that no person present at that
conference would be capable of understanding any more
than six of the thirty papers presented.

c. Formal logic, for example, is among the most highly
theoretical of pursuits; its methods, however, find
almost universal application. Scientists, consultants,
politicians, etc., all attempt to use - or abuse -
logical principles in order to attain their ends. We
might consider the academic community itself, the
resources and support services of a university, to be
the "technical support" whereby logicians are repaid.

d. Some studies place the range of variation in I.Q. due to
environmental influences as high as forty points. The
fact that I.Q. tests are all norm-biased is, of course,
another problem.

E N D N O T E S

1. J. S. Mill, On Liberty, NY: Norton & Co. Inc., 1975, p.66

2. ibid., p. 62

3. Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 166

4. Kenneth Sayre, Cybernetics & the Philosophy of Mind, Humanities Press, 1976, p. 100

5. Lewontin, Biology as Ideology, p. 37

6. Mill, Utilitarianism, p.166